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Court Chooses a New Direction in




and ANNA C. SHIMKO**
During the month of June 1987, the United States Supreme Court
announced two of its most significant land use decisions of the last fifty
years. The Court's rulings in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles I and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission2
tipped the scales toward the side of property owners in the endless strug-
gle between the state's power to freely regulate land use in order to bene-
fit the health, safety, and welfare of the general public and the power of
private landowners to make productive use of their lands in whatever
manner they see fit. Although the Court has clearly chosen a new direc-
tion, considerable uncertainty exists over how these landmark cases will
be applied to future land-use planning decisions. For this reason, the
history, holdings, and implications of these two cases deserve careful
consideration.
I. The First English Decision
A. Highlights of the Decision
In the First English case, the Court determined, in a six to three
decision, that when a land-use regulation is judicially invalidated and
thereafter abandoned by the legislative agency, the United States Consti-
tution demands that the government pay compensation to the landowner
* Partner, Freytag, LaForce, Teofan & Falik, San Francisco, California. A.B. 1968,
Cornell University; J.D. 1971, Harvard Law School.
** Associate, Freytag, LaForce, Teofan & Falik, San Francisco, California. B.A. 1983,
University of California at Davis; J.D. 1986, Cornell University.
1. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
2. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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for the temporary "taking" of his property. 3 The Court avoided making
such a pronouncement regarding "temporary" regulatory takings in sim-
ilar cases for almost the entire last decade. 4 Curiously, the Supreme
Court chose to announce this policy in a case involving an ordinance of a
type that is typically upheld on the basis of the state's authority to enact
safety regulations through the traditional exercise of the police power.5
In First English, a church in Los Angeles County had developed a
retreat center and a recreational area for handicapped children on its
twenty-one acre parcel of property. 6 In 1978, storm runoff caused the
creek flowing through the property to overflow, thereby flooding the land
and destroying the buildings. 7 In 1979, Los Angeles County responded
with action that appeared to be a traditional exercise of its police power
prerogative-enacting an interim ordinance8 which prohibited develop-
ment in this flood protection area.9
The church filed a complaint against the county alleging that the
ordinance prohibited all use of its property and that it should receive just
compensation for its loss.'0 Both the California Superior Court and the
Court of Appeal rejected the church's cause of action, feeling obligated to
follow the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. City of
Tiburon. I" In Agins, the California Supreme Court held that a land-
owner may not maintain an inverse condemnation suit for damages based
upon a regulatory taking, but may only seek invalidation of the offensive
regulation so that it would not burden the property in the future.12
3. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
4. See, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986);
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
5. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887) ("A prohibition simply upon
the use of property for purposes that are declared ... to be injurious to the health, morals, or
safety of the community, cannot ... be deemed a taking .... "); see also Goldblatt v. Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1961) ("If [an] ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of... police
powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it
unconstitutional.").
6. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2381.
7. Id.
8. This ordinance subsequently became permanent, but this did not affect the Court's
decision. Id. at 2384 n.7.
9. Id. at 2381.
10. Id. at 2382.
11. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other grounds. 447
U.S. 255 (1980).
12. Id. at 273, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (a permanent scenic zoning measure
was at issue in Agins and prohibited the construction of dwellings designed to house two or
more families).
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The United States Supreme Court in First English, however, ac-
cepted without consideration the church's allegation that the ordinance
denied the church all use of its property, 13 thereby sidestepping the
threshold takings issue. The Court ruled that if the ordinance is invali-
dated on remand to the California courts, the property owner is entitled,
by virtue of the takings provisions of the United States Constitution's
fifth amendment 14 (as incorporated in the fourteenth amendment 15), to
monetary damages for the deprivation suffered during the period between
enactment and invalidation of the ordinance.1 6 The Court observed that
when property is subject to an unconstitutionally excessive regulation,
such property has been "taken" by the government and the property
owner is entitled to compensation. 17 The Court determined that exces-
sive regulation of property-even for the period of time that it takes to
have the ordinance invalidated by a court-effects a taking, albeit "tem-
porary" in nature, which is worthy of a compensatory remedy.
1 8
B. Unresolved Issues
(1) What is a Regulatory Taking?
Unfortunately, as is frequently the case with landmark decisions,
First English raises more questions than it answers. For instance, the case
does not clearly define what constitutes an unconstitutional regulatory
"taking." The question remains whether to establish a compensable reg-
ulatory taking a landowner must prove only that the burdensome regula-
tion precluded him from using his property, or whether, in addition, he
must also establish that the enactment of the regulation extended beyond
the government's legitimate exercise of its police power.
The First English opinion contains seemingly contradictory lan-
guage on this issue. Initially, the Court implies that evidence of both of
these factors is necessary to establish a compensable regulatory taking.
Because the Court's decision was based on the adequacy of the church's
13. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
14. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be... deprived of... property,
without due process of law, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
15. The fifth amendment was made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897).
16. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
17. Id. at 2386.
18. Id. at 2388 (" 'temporary' takings... are not different in kind from permanent tak-
ings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation").
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complaint as a matter of law and not as a resolution of the facts in the
case, the Court cautioned:
We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance
at issue actually denied appellant all use of its property or whether the
county might avoid the conclusion that a compensable taking had oc-
curred by establishing that the denial of all use was insulated as a part
of the State's authority to enact safety regulations. These questions, of
course, remain open for decision on the remand we direct today. 19
Conversely, near the end of the decision, the Court states, "We
merely hold that where the government's activities have already worked
a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective."
'20
The threshold issue, then, becomes what requirements must be met
to establish a taking. Although the Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon 21
held that the city's zoning ordinances did not effect a taking of property
without just compensation,2 2 the Court noted that "the application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if (1) the ordi-
nance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, or (2) de-
nies an owner economically viable use of his land."'2 3 The Supreme
Court in Agins plainly indicated that only one of these two prongs must
be satisfied to establish a regulatory taking. Therefore, deprivation of use
alone, through the enactment of an intrusive land-use ordinance, could
constitute a taking. Certainly, a taking test requiring proof of only one of
the Agins prongs would simplify the analysis and increase the probability
of recovery of damages by property owners made possible by First
English.
Recently, the Agins two-pronged takings test was used by the
Supreme Court to test the validity of a land-use regulation, giving further
credence to the theory that only one of these prongs must be proved to
establish a compensable regulatory taking. In the case of Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,2 4 decided in March 1987, the
Court considered the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Subsidence
Act.25 The Court ultimately found that the petitioners had not success-
19. Id. at 2384-85 (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 2389.
21. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
22. Id. at 262-63.
23. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
24. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
25. This law, quite similar to the statute struck down by the Court in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), prohibits coal mining that will cause subsidence damage to
public buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries and requires that up to approximately 50% of the
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fully established the existence of either of the Agins factors and that the
regulation, therefore, did not effect a taking.26 However, it is certainly
significant that the Agins test was applied in Keystone and that the Court
stated that a "statute regulating the uses that can be made of property
effects a taking if it 'denies an owner economically viable use of his
land.' "27
If Supreme Court policy is construed as mandating that deprivation
of all economic use, standing alone, constitutes a compensable taking
(even if the subject regulation substantially advances legitimate state in-
terests and is therefore a reasonable exercise of police power), the practi-
cal ramifications will be enormous. A requirement that local agencies
compensate property owners whenever legitimate health and safety regu-
lations preclude landowners from using their property would, undoubt-
edly, constitute a substantial financial burden to local government
entities. Although it may seem that fairness and justice would be served
by compensating property owners for the private loss that they suffer in
order to benefit the general public welfare, it would be surprising if the
state's exercise of its legitimate constitutional powers was to be so effec-
tively circumscribed by a broad reimbursement requirement. This is true
particularly in such times of dwindling government coffers. That type of
justice and fairness, however, may be precisely what the First English
Court envisions as a result of its decision. Clearly, as Justice Stevens
noted in his dissenting opinion in First English, future litigation will de-
termine how broadly the First English compensation mandate is ap-
plied. 28 Perhaps, if the pendulum swings in another direction, a creative
court might attempt to balance the benefits and burdens in a different
manner and private property owners may someday be required to recom-
coal beneath these structures be kept intact. The petitioners brought a takings claim, contend-
ing that the Act interfered with their property right to extract coal and to erect facilities on the
surface. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1237-39.
26. Id. at 1242.
27. Id. at 1247 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 294-96 (1981) (citation omitted)). Query whether, after First English, the investment-
backed expectations test is dead. In numerous instances, the Court has stated that regulations
which unduly interfere with a property owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations or
that prevent economically viable use of land may be unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 125 (1985); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Court in First English does
not mention this standard and only discusses a prohibition of all use of property. This may,
however, and probably should, in light of Court precedent, be interpreted to mean "all reason-
able and economically viable" use of property.
28. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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pense the government for actions taken which enhance the value of pri-
vate property.
Justice Stevens maintains that "some sort of improper purpose or
insufficient justification" must be alleged in order to properly challenge
the constitutionality of an ordinance.29 Justice Stevens attempts to limit
the application of the majority opinion to instances in which both prongs
of the Agins test are met. Stevens argues that the Court "does not, and
could not under our precedents, hold that the allegations sufficiently al-
leged a taking or that the County's effort to preserve life and property
could ever constitute a taking."'30 In particular, Stevens referred to the
traditional nuisance exception to the takings doctrine, established in such
cases as Hadacheck v. City of Los Angeles 31 and Mugler v. Kansas,
32
whereby a health and safety regulation cannot constitute a taking be-
cause all individuals hold property under an implied obligation to refrain
from injurious or noxious uses of their property.33 The three dissenting
members of the Court clearly feel that there can never be a taking with-
out an improper and arbitrary exercise of the police power by the rule-
promulgating agency. The majority opinion, however, does not clearly
resolve this crucial issue; property owners and governmental bodies must
await future clarification of the Court's analysis to determine in what
circumstances apparently legitimate exercises of the police power will
give rise to compensation.
(2) How Will Damages Be Measured?
Another issue left for future resolution concerns the manner in
which damages will be calculated once a court finds that a temporary
taking has occurred. The Court states that "invalidation of [an] ordi-
nance without payment of fair value for the use of the property" during
the lifetime of the ordinance would be constitutionally insufficient.34 The
Court does not indicate, however, the method by which "fair value"
should be calculated. In the past, courts have calculated "fair value" on
the basis of a fair rental value for the property, 35 interest on the prop-
29. Id. at 2392 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (emissions from brickyard).
32. 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (intoxicating liquors).
33. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 2389.
35. Generally, the measure of damages for temporary physical takings of property is
computed on the basis of the property's fair rental value during the period of the taking. See
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Petty Motor Co.,
327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); see also
Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 53, 500 P.2d 1345, 1356, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 11-12
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erty's market value,36 (these two methods perhaps most logically con-
strue the Court's words), diminution in the property's value over the
subject time period,37 actual damages suffered due to the deprivation of
use,38 and other measures of damages. Ordinarily, the market value of
property dictates the level of compensation for a permanent taking.
39
Naturally, property's market value is dependent upon the actual use and
potential use of the property. In cases likely to give rise to temporary
taking damages, the permissible use of property and, therefore, the prop-
erty's market value, may be unclear at the time a court awards damages.
Hence, a damage valuation based on a traditional market value theory
could prove difficult to apply. The method ultimately used to calculate
damages for temporary takings may, in large part, determine the magni-
tude of the practical effects of First English. 40
(1972) (property owner awarded loss of rental income attributable to city's unreasonable
precondemnation publicity); People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Dunn, 46 Cal. 2d 639, 641,
297 P.2d 964, 966 (1956) (rental income is a proper element to consider in ascertaining market
value of condemned property).
36. In Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502 (8th Cir. 1985), one of the few cases
prior to First English in which true regulatory-taking damages were awarded, the Eighth Cir-
cuit utilized an interest rate factor to calculate damages. Nemmers' land, which had been
zoned "light industrial," was annexed to the City of Dubuque and rezoned "residential." The
Court determined that Nemmers possessed a vested right in the light industrial zone status of
the land and should receive just compensation for the city's abrogation of that right. The
parties agreed that the appropriate measure of compensation was the interest (at the rate of
15%) that would have accrued on the difference between the fair market values of the property
under the proper (light industrial) and improper (residential) zoning classifications over the
three and a half year period during which the property was wrongly classified. Id. at 505.
Note that the usefulness of such an interest-based formula for calculating regulatory-taking
damages may be limited to situations where the constitutionally appropriate designation for
the subject property is reasonably identifiable and its effects quantifiable. See infra note 40.
37. The use of the diminution in value concept to measure taking damages would consti-
tute a departure from previous case law. E.g., Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 7 (diminution in
property's value over the time of a temporary taking is considered an improper measure of
damages).
38. Traditionally, lost profits have not been considered by courts awarding damages for
the taking of property. See, e.g., United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 281-82
(1943); Dunn, 46 Cal. 2d at 641, 297 P.2d at 966.
39. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.310 (West 1982) (the measure of compensa-
tion which shall be awarded for property taken is fair market value); see also id. § 1263.320
(West 1982) (fair market value is the highest price to which a seller and buyer, acting with no
particular urgency, would agree).
40. First English may serve as the springboard for further judicial attention to and activ-
ity in the area of takings damage compensation. Although it has been quipped by some that
the Court's decisions in First English and Nollan were the "Lawyer's Full Employment Act of
1987," the same might be said of those decisions' effect on appraisers, real estate experts, and
land-use specialists (some of whom may also be lawyers), whose opinions could prove crucial
in determining damages to be awarded to property owners who have suffered temporary regu-
latory takings. Such experts are necessary because taking damages need not be based solely
upon the subject property's current and governmentally sanctioned use. See id. § 1263.320
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C. Legal Background Leading to First English
In order to fully grasp the importance and the potential implications
of First English, it is important to consider the context in which the
Supreme Court considered this temporary taking case. More than sixty
years ago, the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon41 concluded that
overly restrictive land-use regulations could be unconstitutional. Justice
Holmes, writing for the majority, stated that "[t]he general rule at least
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'42 In the intervening years
(West 1982). For instance, a property owner may be able to obtain enhancement damages if
the owner can prove that his property's market value is actually higher than the value of its
current use due to projected market needs or the effects of a nearby project that would enhance
the property's value. See, e.g., People ex rel. Dep't of Water Resources v. Andresen, 193 Cal.
App. 3d 1144, 1153-56, 238 Cal. Rptr. 826, 832-34 (1987) (property owner entitled to damages
based on reasonable expectation that the state would, in the future, purchase granite from
property's then dormant quarry for repairs to nearby state dams); Merced Irrigation Dist. v.
Woolstenhulme, 4 Cal. 3d 478, 495, 483 P.2d 1, 12, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833, 844 (1971) (condemnee
must be compensated for increase in land value due to anticipation of the benefits of a pro-
posed improvement, as long as condemnee's property was not expected to be taken as part of
the improvement).
Similarly, property's compensable market value may reflect a consideration of all the uses
to which the property may be readily converted and for which it is available. People ex reL
Dep't of Pub. Works v. Flintkote, 264 Cal. App. 2d 97, 102, 70 Cal. Rptr. 27, 30 (1968) ("In
this connection, the highest and most profitable use for which the property is adaptable and
needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is to be considered, not as the
measure of value, but to the extent that the prospect of such uses affects the market value of
the land; however, elements affecting value which, while possible, are not reasonably probable,
should be excluded."); United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275 (1943) ("In that connec-
tion the value may be determined in light of the special or higher use of the land when com-
bined with other parcels .... But in order for that special adaptability to be considered, there
must be a reasonable probability of the lands in question being combined with other tracts for
that purpose in the reasonably near future.").
If an aggrieved property owner is able to demonstrate, with reasonable certainty, how his
property is likely to be zoned after a court invalidates a regulation applicable to the property,
the property's permitted uses under the probable zoning classification can be taken into ac-
count in establishing appropriate temporary regulatory taking damages. See City of Los Ange-
les v. Decker, 18 Cal. 3d 860, 867, 558 P.2d 545, 549, 135 Cal. Rptr. 647. 651 (1977) ("[T]he
condemnee is entitled to show a reasonable probability of a zoning change in the near future
and thus to establish ... the highest and best use of the property .... ); Dunn. 46 Cal. 2d at
642, 297 P.2d at 966 (admitted evidence of probable future zoning change).
Furthermore, where a court has ruled that a land use regulation is constitutionally imper-
missible, the limited (if any) uses permitted under the invalid ordinance cannot be used as
evidence of the property's market value for calculation of damages. See People ex rel. State
Pub. Works Bd. v. Talleur, 79 Cal. App. 3d 690, 696, 145 Cal. Rptr. 150, 152 (1978)
("[W]here the land use regulation is unconstitutional, either because it is unrelated to a permis-
sible governmental objective and aimed solely at depressing land values or where the regula-
tion has some other constitutional infirmity, it is not admissible evidence of value.").
41. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
42. Id. at 415. The Court held that a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the mining of
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between Pennsylvania Coal and First English, the Court has never re-
tracted its statement that a government regulation could constitute a tak-
ing of property; in fact, this principle was consistently applied in cases
subsequent to Pennsylvania Coal.43 However, as Justice Holmes also
stated in Pennsylvania Coal, "government could hardly go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without pay-
ing for every such change in the general law."44 It is this dynamic ten-
sion between legitimate exercises of the police power and governmental
action that "goes too far" that spawned the First English and Nollan
decisions.
In addition to recognizing regulatory takings, the Court also has
consistently awarded monetary damages to landowners whose property
has been physically invaded by the government on a temporary basis. In
United States v. Causby,45 the Court ruled that a landowner should be
compensated for an easement taken by the government due to frequent
flights of military airplanes over his land at low altitudes.46 The Court
ruled that the invasion was a taking violative of the fifth amendment
whether it was on a permanent or temporary basis.47 Also, when the
government appropriated private property for its use during World War
II, property owners were compensated for the government's temporary
physical interference with the use of their property.48
The Court, therefore, had consistently concluded that when govern-
mental action physically intruded upon a landowner's use of property,
even temporarily, such action could be deemed to be a taking in inverse
condemnation, 49 as contrasted to direct takings whereby the governmen-
certain coal in a way that weakens the land supporting dwellings amounted to an unconstitu-
tional taking because it "destroy[ed] previously existing rights of property .. " Id. at 412-14.
43. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) ("Here, the Govern-
ment's attempt to create a public right of access to the improved pond goes so far beyond
ordinary regulation... as to amount to a taking under the logic of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).").
44. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
45. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
46. Id. at 260-61.
47. Id. at 268. Indeed, the Court did not decide whether the taking was permanent or
temporary; rather, it remanded the case to the Court of Claims to decide that issue in order to
determine the proper amount of compensation due to the property owner.
48. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373
(1945).
49. Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a government agency to recover the
value of property taken by the agency though no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been completed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740 (5th ed. 1979); see, e.g., Mac-
Donald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
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tal body commences eminent domain proceedings and voluntarily pays
for the property. In contrast to the physical taking type of cases in which
a clear line of decision had been established, regulatory takings for overly
burdensome land-use regulations remained in a quagmire of legal uncer-
tainty. First English finally clarifies that a temporary taking, which is
accomplished through regulatory rather than physical means, must be
monetarily compensated.
Although this link between concepts seems a logical step for the
Court to take, the Supreme Court has studiously avoided making a clear
pronouncement that regulatory takings require compensation in similar
cases for almost the last decade. In Agins, the California Supreme Court
considered a zoning ordinance substantially limiting the number of
dwelling units that could be built on the plaintiff's land. The court deter-
mined that a landowner who alleges that an ordinance has worked a dep-
rivation of substantially all use of its land may attempt, through
declaratory relief or writ of mandamus, to invalidate the ordinance as a
constitutionally excessive regulation, but may not "elect to sue in inverse
condemnation and thereby transmute an excessive use of the police
power into a lawful taking for which compensation in eminent domain
must be paid."' 50 On appeal the United States Supreme Court held that
the zoning ordinance, on its face, did not take the appellant's property
without just compensation because it neither prevented the best use of
appellant's land nor extinguished a fundamental attribute of ownership. 5'
Since the property owner might be permitted to build as many as five
homes on its five-acre parcel of land, the Court felt that fifth amendment
"justice and fairness" were satisfied. 52 Moreover, in ruling that no taking
had occurred, the Court found it unnecessary to consider whether the
remedies available for a regulatory taking could be limited to nonmone-
tary compensation.
5 3
Since the Court did not disturb the ruling of the California Supreme
Court relative to the proper remedy for a regulatory taking, the Califor-
nia Agins ruling on the compensation issue has bound California courts
(and, conversely, "liberated" California planning authorities) for the last
eight years. Only now, through the First English decision, has a majority
of the Supreme Court supplied new direction by clarifying its policy on
this significant issue. In First English, the Court discussed the Agins
50. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372.
375 (1979), 447 U.S. 255 (1980), affd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
51. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980).
52. Id. at 262-63.
53. Id. at 263.
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holding, commenting that, "[w]hile the Supreme Court of California may
not have actually disavowed this general rule [requiring compensation
for regulatory takings] in Agins, we believe that it has truncated the rule
by disallowing damages that occurred prior to the ultimate invalidation
of the challenged regulation."'54  In light of the supremacy of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal constitution's mandates in
this area, California courts recognize that the California Supreme
Court's Agins holding on the compensation for regulatory takings issue
has been superseded by First English.
In at least three cases since Agins, the United States Supreme Court
had been presented with the opportunity to consider whether temporary
regulatory takings are compensable. 55 The Court chose, however, to
sidestep and carefully avoid reaching the compensation issue, even when
certiorari had been granted presumably for the sole purpose of deciding
the issue. In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,56 a prop-
erty owner challenged a change in the zoning designation of its land from
a partially industrial, partially agricultural "holding" zone to open-space
land.5 7 A California Superior Court jury had awarded the property
owner $3,000,000 in damages for this taking of its land.5 8 The California
Court of Appeal, in considering the case for a second time,59 reversed the
superior court because it felt that Agins was dispositive on the issue of
disallowing damages for a regulatory taking.60 The court of appeal also
declined to consider the constitutional validity of San Diego's open-space
plan, preferring to permit the property owner to retry the case in superior
court on that issue.61 The United States Supreme Court ultimately dis-
missed the appeal due to the absence of any determination as to whether
54. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2387.
55. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2563 (1986) (appel-
lant had sought damages in an inverse condemnation proceeding for the denial of its residen-
tial subdivision plan); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 175 (1985) (respondent sought compensation when the local planning commission
did not approve respondent's development proposal); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 626 (1981) (appellant sought damages for inverse condemnation due to
the city's rezoning of its land for open space).
56. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
57. Id. at 624-25.
58. Id. at 627.
59. Initially, the California Court of Appeal denied the city's petition for rehearing, but
the California Supreme Court subsequently granted the city's petition. The California
Supreme Court, however, then transferred the case back to the court of appeal, directing it to
reconsider the case under Agins. Id. at 628.
60. Id. at 629.
61. Id. at 630.
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there had been a taking. 62 The issue of available remedies for a regula-
tory taking was, therefore, not reached, since the case was found not ripe
for the Supreme Court's determination. The makings of a majority deci-
sion favoring temporary taking compensation was beginning, however, to
take form.
One of the most noteworthy aspects of San Diego Gas & Electric was
Justice Brennan's lengthy dissent, in which he traced Supreme Court pre-
cedent and concluded that the United States Constitution dictates that a
regulatory taking must be monetarily compensated. Justice Brennan
stated that the California Supreme Court in Agins had mischaracterized
Court precedent concerning regulatory takings and he proposed the rule
which the majority of the Court ultimately embraced in First English.
63
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the majority decision in San Diego
Gas & Electric that the Court could not decide the case on the merits due
to the lack of a final judgment from the California courts. Justice Rehn-
quist noted that if there had been a final state court judgment in the case,
he "would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan."' 64 Rehnquist's concurring
opinion, together with Brennan's dissent, were harbingers of First Eng-
lish; members of the Court were beginning to form a consensus with re-
gard to the constitutional necessity to compensate temporary regulatory
takings in the proper case.
The budding First English majority, however, was not quick to coa-
lesce. In 1985, the Supreme Court again refused to consider a case which
raised the regulatory-taking compensation issue. The Court concluded
that the case was unripe because the property owner had neither sought
variances allowing it to develop the property after its plan was rejected
by the planning authority nor had the landowner utilized the proper pro-
cedures for obtaining just compensation prior to initiating suit.
65
Most recently, in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 66
the property owner claimed that the county had appropriated the entire
economic use of its property in order to provide a public open-space
buffer. The Court failed to reach the compensation issue by holding that
62. Id. at 629-33.
63. Id. at 653 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Curiously, although Justice Brennan reaffirms
his position in San Diego Gas & Electric by joining the majority in First English, he regarded
the majority decision in NAollan as having gone too far. He authored a scathing dissent in that
case.
64. Id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
65. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985).
66. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
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there was no final and authoritative designation of the type and intensity
of development that would be legally permitted on the property.67 Such
designation, the Court said, was an essential prerequisite to a fifth
amendment regulatory taking claim.68 Although the property owner's
residential subdivision plan had been rejected by the county, the Court
believed that the landowner should have submitted an application for a
different level or type of development in order to explore the possibility
that some development of the property might ultimately be permitted.
Finally, in June 1987, Chief Justice Rehnquist decided that First
English was the proper case to conclude that regulatory takings, even if
they are only temporary, require compensation. The Chief Justice was
joined in his First English opinion by all of the San Diego Gas & Electric
dissenters remaining on the Court-Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Powell-as well as Justices White and Scalia. First English sets forth the
options available to a government entity whenever a court determines
that a taking has been wrought by regulation. The government may (1)
withdraw its invalidated regulation, (2) amend the regulation so as to
avoid the taking, or (3) exercise its power of eminent domain to purchase
the property for the public good. 69 Whatever option the government ex-
ercises to rid itself of the unconstitutional regulation, compensation is
mandated where the regulation has wrought total deprivation of use dur-
ing its period of application.
D. Implications of First English
The implications of the First English decision may be extraordinary,
particularly in California where a recently reconstituted state supreme
court 70 could utilize the directive of First English to either reverse or
carefully limit a number of land-use cases denying compensation in in-
verse condemnation cases. The First English ruling represents a drastic
and significant departure from the land-use and inverse condemnation
rules which have operated in California since the 1979 Agins decision.
Between the Agins and First English decisions, when the Court's in-
tentions regarding the compensation issue were unclear, the United
States Supreme Court never indicated that it would retreat from its ear-
lier holdings that unreasonable regulations could constitute takings in
violation of the fifth amendment, nor did it indicate that monetary dam-
67. Id. at 2566, 2568.
68. Id. at 2566.
69. 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987).
70. In November of 1986, the California voters refused to reconfirm Chief Justice Rose
Bird and Associate Justices Cruz Reynoso and Joseph Grodin.
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ages would not be constitutionally required, or would not be permitted,
to compensate for a regulatory taking. Nonetheless, the California
Supreme Court's Agins decision had represented an absolute directive
against monetary compensation for regulatory takings The impetus for
the California Agins ruling was the fear of inhibiting the freedom of gov-
ernmental agencies in the exercise of their land-use planning responsibili-
ties. The California Supreme Court was concerned that the availability
of an inverse condemnation remedy to aggrieved property owners would
have a chilling effect upon the legitimate exercise of regulatory authority
by local government .7 The California Supreme Court predicted that, if
compensation was an available remedy for excessive regulations, land-use
policy makers would be unduly inhibited from implementing legitimate
land-use goals which operate to benefit the public.72 The California
Agins decision assured local planning agencies that they could wield
abundant leverage and power over the use and development of lands
within their jurisdiction without fear of being required to compensate
landowners for mistakenly overstepping constitutional restrictions on
their regulatory prerogative.
Until First English, Agins had been staunchly followed in Califor-
nia.73  The broad public policies discussed in Agins, seemingly very
favorable to governmental authority to regulate land use without fear of
monetary reprisal, have been a theme throughout the disposition of other
land-use cases in the California courts.74
71. "Community planners must be permitted the flexibility which their work requires,"
otherwise their work would come to a grinding halt or deteriorate. Agins v. City of Tiburon,
24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 377 (1979) (citing Selby Realty Co. v.
City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 120, 514 P.2d 111, 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 805
(1973)).
72. Id. at 277-78, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
73. See, e.g., Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 138 Cal. App. 3d 484, 494,
188 Cal. Rptr. 191, 196 (1982) ("this court is obligated to follow Agins"), appeal dismissed,
464 U.S. 805 (1983); Toso v. City of Santa Barbara, 101 Cal. App. 3d 934, 949, 162 Cal. Rptr.
210, 218 ("A zoning ordinance that completely destroys the value of the property can only be
challenged by an action for declaratory relief or mandamus, and a plaintiff cannot recover on
the theory of inverse condemnation ...."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 901 (1980).
74. See, e.g., California v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 766 F.2d 1308, 1314 (9th
Cir. 1985) (no project may be approved by Tahoe Regional Planning Agency-established by
an interstate compact between California and Nevada-without written findings that the pro-
ject's effects will not exceed the "adopted environmental threshold carrying capacity"); Pen-
nell v. City of San Jose, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 373-74, 721 P.2d 1111, 1117-18, 228 Cal. Rptr. 726.
732-33 (1986) (upholding rent control ordinance which lists "hardship to a tenant" as one of
seven factors to be considered in establishing validity of a reasonable rent increase), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 1346 (1987); Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 153 Cal. App. 3d 605, 618-19, 200 Cal. Rptr. 575, 583 (1984) (broad mandate to
protect the San Francisco bay allows agency to hold landowner responsible for unauthorized
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It remains to be seen whether these courts will apply First English to
other land-use cases in California or whether its effect will be limited by
its facts. For example, a broad reading of First English might require
that local governmental agencies pay compensation for temporary regu-
latory takings whenever building moratoria are imposed on landowners.
Likewise, growth control initiatives and ordinances could come under
constitutional attack after First English. California courts, however,
have traditionally upheld temporary measures to preserve the status quo
pending the adoption of a comprehensive zoning plan or the provision of
important public services. 75. Such building moratoria have generally
been upheld as a proper exercise of the state's police power. First Eng-
lish, however, suggests that the mere legitimacy of the state's interest in
precluding use of land may no longer insulate governmental agencies
from claims for compensation due to landowners' inability to utilize their
lands on a temporary basis. If such measures were declared regulatory
takings, some local planning agencies could find themselves caught in a
land-use dilemma. For instance, a city might be required by state law to
update its general plan 76 and to cease permitting development in the in-
terim or to prohibit further development until the city's sewer capacity is
upgraded to meet present or projected demand. At the same time, the
city might be obligated, under First English, to compensate landowners
who are temporarily deprived of all beneficial use of their property. The
effect on cities and counties of such a scenario could be financially devas-
tating. Although this policy might be fair and equitable as concerns prop-
erty owners who are deprived of the use of their land, the normal
fill activities conducted by third parties despite landowner's lack of knowledge or negligence);
Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati, 148 Cal. App. 3d 280, 286-90, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 825, 829-31 (1983) (local rent control ordinance did not constitute a taking of property).
75. See, e.g., Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596-611,
557 P.2d 473, 481-90, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 49-58 (1976) (upheld ordinance prohibiting issuance
of residential building permits until educational, sewage disposal, and water supply facilities
were upgraded); State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 252-55, 524 P.2d 1281, 1291-92, 115
Cal. Rptr. 497, 507-09 (1974) (ruling that the Coastal Zone Conservation Commission's denial
of a developer's permit did not constitute compensable taking on the ground that the land
might be used for public use in a plan expected to be implemented by the commission.); Metro
Realty v. County of El Dorado, 222 Cal. App. 2d 508, 513-15, 35 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1963)
(upholding an interim urgency measure designed to conserve water); Hunter v. Adams, 180
Cal. App. 2d 511, 518-24, 4 Cal. Rptr. 776, 782-84 (1960) (upholding city council resolution
prohibiting issuance of building permits for projects within redevelopment area, so as to main-
tain status quo for at least one year).
76. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (West Supp. 1987) requires that each city and county
prepare and adopt a comprehensive, long-term general plan for future physical development.
All subsequent regulation must comply with these long-term general plans. See generally J.
LONGTIN, LONGTIN'S CALIFORNIA LAND USE 171-222 (2d ed. 1987) (background discussion
of general and specific plans).
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functions of governmental agencies might be so inhibited that courts may
be required to come to the government's rescue by limiting such a broad
application of First English.
It is important to realize that, even after First English, if the state's
purpose in enacting a land-use regulation is permissible, the regulation
must preclude the landowner from all economically viable use of its land
to be declared invalid and thereby give rise to a right of compensation.
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 7 7 the Court em-
phasized that the unit of property to be examined when considering the
use-deprivation issue is the entire parcel of property owned by the com-
plaining party. 78 A landowner's inability to make any use of a specific
portion of its property, therefore, is not likely to constitute a taking. In
Keystone, petitioners urged that the segments of underground coal which
would have to be left unmined in order to ensure against surface subsi-
dence was a unit of property which was legally separate from the whole
of their mining property and for which they should be compensated.
79
The Court rejected this argument, applying its analysis instead to the
overall parcel of land.8 0 The Court relied on its decision in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,8 1 where it stated that "'[t]aking'
jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discreet segments in an
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated. '8 2 Although it was estimated that twenty-seven mil-
lion tons of petitioners' coal would be affected by the subject regulation,
the Court in Keystone maintained that this particular amount of coal did
not constitute a separate segment of property for takings law purposes.
The Court elaborated as follows:
Many zoning ordinances place limits on the property owner's
right to make profitable use of some segments of his property. A re-
quirement that a building occupy no more than a specified percentage
of the lot on which it is located could be characterized as a taking of
the vacant area as readily as the requirement that coal pillars be left in
place. Similarly, under petitioners' theory one could always argue that
a set-back ordinance requiring that no structure be built within a cer-
tain distance from the property line constitutes a taking because the
footage represents a distinct segment of property for takings law
purposes.
8 3
77. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) (decided three months before First English).
78. Id. at 1248-49.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
82. Id. at 130.
83. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1249.
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First English does not affect this segmentation of property principle,
but rather speaks merely to the denial of all use of property. Following
the reasoning of Keystone, if the interim flood protection ordinance at
issue in First English had affected only a portion of the church's property
and had permitted church use of the rest of the property, the church
would not have been eligible for compensation.
First English could also apply where a governmental body has ex-
ceeded the prescribed time limits for taking final action on a project ap-
plication. California Government Code sections 65920-65963.1,
commonly referred to as "A.B. 884" (after its Assembly Bill designation
prior to enactment), provides a statutory scheme essentially requiring
governmental bodies to approve or deny a project within a period of one
year after the project application is deemed to be complete,8 4 with allow-
ance for certain limited extensions of time.85 If the project is not ap-
proved or disapproved within the applicable time periods, it is deemed to
be approved by operation of law.86 In the recent decision of Palmer v.
City of Ojai 87 California's Second District Court of Appeal upheld the
statutory scheme enunciated in A.B. 884, concluding that the time limits
enumerated in A.B. 884 are mandatory and must be followed as a matter
of law.
88
In its decision, the court disposed of the developer's prayer for more
than six million dollars in damages by relying on the Agins rule prohibit-
ing compensation for temporary takings.89 The appellate court con-
cluded that, under Agins, monetary damages were not available to the
developer. 90 Although the affirmative adoption of a flood control ordi-
nance which effectively deprives a landowner of all use of its property, as
was the case in First English, is clearly different from the failure to follow
mandatory time limits for acting upon a project, the consequence for the
landowner is exactly the same-an inability to use its property as a result
of government action which may be determined to be unauthorized. In a
factual scenario similar to First English, it remains to be seen whether the
California courts will apply First English to determine that a compensa-
84. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65950 (West Supp. 1987).
85. Id. § 65957 (permitting a single ninety day extension upon consent of public agency
and applicant).
86. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65956(b) (West 1983) provides that "[i]n the event that a lead
agency or a responsible agency fails to act to approve or to disapprove a development project
within the time limits required by this article, such failure to act shall be deemed approval of
the development project."
87. 178 Cal. App. 3d 280, 223 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1986).
88. Id. at 293, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
89. Id. at 294-95, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
90. Id.
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ble temporary taking can arise under A.B. 884 if governmental bodies do
not follow the statute's time limitations.
In whatever manner the California courts ultimately apply First
English, it is indisputable that, as the First English dissent stated with
concern, the Court's decision is sure to ignite a "litigation explosion." 9'
Justice Stevens, in his dissent, opined that the long range policy implica-
tions of First English will be far reaching, and that much of the litigation
generated by the decision will be unproductive.92 The dissenters pre-
dicted that the First English decision may have a chilling effect on local
planning officials, prompting them to avoid action which aggressively re-
stricts land use for fear of litigation and the possibility of damage recov-
ery against them.93 Justice Stevens' dissent warns that "much important
regulation will never be enacted, even perhaps in the health and safety
area." 9
4
The First English majority was not unmindful of these potential ef-
fects and stated, "[w]e realize that even our present holding will un-
doubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land use
planners and governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting
land-use regulations. '95 The Court explicitly stated, however, that the
holding in First English was limited to its facts and did not address the
"quite different questions that would arise in a case of normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances and
the like."' 96 Planning process delays, therefore, may not ultimately be
compensable under First English, but it is possible that unreasonable de-
lays could give rise to actions for compensation under a temporary regu-
latory taking theory.
II. The Court's Next Step-Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission
A. Highlights of the Nollan Decision
Two weeks after it decided First English, the Supreme Court an-
nounced its decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.97 The
Supreme Court, by a five to four decision in Nollan, 98 concluded that the
91. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2390, 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 2399-400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 2389.
96. Id.
97. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
98. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
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California Coastal Commission cannot require private property owners
to provide public access to beaches in return for project permit approvals
without strict justification. 99 Justice Brennan, who had joined the major-
ity in First English, wrote a vigorous dissent in Nollan, stating that it was
the Court, rather than the coastal commission's regulation, which had
gone too far.
The Nollans had acquired an option to purchase a parcel of Ventura
County coastline property upon which a small, one-story, rundown bun-
galow was situated. 10° The Nollans applied to the California Coastal
Commission for a permit to demolish the existing structure and to re-
place it with a two-story, three-bedroom home, encompassing three times
the square footage of the bungalow.101 The demolition and replacement
of the bungalow was a condition precedent to the Nollans' exercise of
their purchase option. 102 Over the Nollans' protest, the coastal commis-
sion granted the permit subject to a requirement that the Nollans grant a
lateral access easement allowing the public to pass alongside the ocean,
back and forth across their beach in the area between their eight foot
seawall and the historic mean high tide line (the demarcation of the prop-
erty's oceanside boundary).10 3 This easement would have enabled the
public to use a substantial portion of the Nollans' property for access
between public beaches to the north and south of the property.1 4 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, concluded that the commission had not
proved the required nexus, or connection, between the building of the
larger home on the property and the condition requiring dedication of
the access easement. 105 The Court characterized the dedication require-
ment as a constitutionally improper appropriation of an easement for an
and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor. Justice Brennan issued a dissenting opinion joined
by Justice Marshall. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent and also joined a separate
dissenting opinion filed by Justice Stevens.
99. 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
100. Id. at 3143.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. The Nollans filed a challenge to the lateral access easement conditions placed on
their permit, and the Ventura County Superior Court agreed with the Nollan's contention that
the commission could not impose the condition unless the commission could demonstrate that
the Nollan's redevelopment would adversely affect public access to the beach. The commis-
sion, however, on remand held a public hearing and issued further factual findings reaffirming
its position, stating that the development "would prevent the public 'psychologically ... from
realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have every right to visit.' "Id. at 3143-44
(citation omitted).
104. Id. at 3143.
105. Id. at 3148 ("Ihe evident constitutional propriety disappears ... if the condition
substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for
the prohibition.").
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otherwise legitimate governmental purpose without the payment of com-
pensation, tantamount to an "out-and-out plan of extortion."',
0 6
The Court, in its reasoning, first recognized that if the Nollans had
not been applying for a discretionary permit, any governmental require-
ment that an easement be dedicated for public use would have clearly
constituted an uncompensated taking of property in violation of the fifth
amendment of the United States Constitution. 0 7 The Court then ques-
tioned whether requiring the easement to be conveyed as a condition for
issuance of a discretionary permit alters the constitutional taking analy-
sis. The Court observed that the coastal commission did possess the au-
thority to simply turn down the Nollans' request for a development
permit, as long as such denial was based on legitimate purposes and did
not preclude the Nollans from all use of their property so as to constitute
a taking. 0 8 The Court ruled that the same legitimate purposes that
could be used as bases to deny the permit application, could also be used
to require an imposition of conditions upon the landowner in return for
approval of the application.109 The Court found, however, that where a
condition imposed in conjunction with project approval utterly fails to
directly further the goal that could have justified complete prohibition of
the project, a condition requiring the dedication of an easement amounts
to an uncompensated "taking." 1 0 Unlike the ordinance at issue in First
English, such a condition is a taking not because the landowner is denied
all use of her property, but because the condition does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests."' Thus, while First English empha-
sized one prong of the two-pronged test announced by the Supreme
106. Id. (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 3145.
108. Id. at 3147.
109. Id. at 3147-48.
110. See supra note 105.
111. This standard has been used often by the Court in reviewing and upholding cases
involving various governmental purposes and regulations. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1242 (1987) (the legislative purposes of preserving
surface land, protecting the public's health and safety and enhancing the land's taxation value
were "genuine, substantial and legitimate" and the restriction of use placed upon the coal was
sufficiently related to these puiposes); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980)
(scenic zoning "substantially advance[d] legitimate governmental goals-); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136-38 (1978) (historic landmark preservation was a legiti-
mate purpose which justified prohibiting the plaintiff from erecting a multi-story building on
its property); United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509 (1945) (improve-
ment of navigation justified the government's raising of the high-water mark which conse-
quently reduced the plaintiff's capacity to generate electricity).
However, the Court in Nollan more precisely defined the substantial advancement test
and gave it some teeth. The Court indicated that regulations restricting the use of property
will henceforth be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. 107 S. Ct. at 3146-47 & n.3, 3150.
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Court in Agins-deprivation of use-Nollan gives new vitality to the
other Agins prong-lack of a legitimate state interest which is substan-
tially advanced by the regulation at issue.1
12
The Nollan Court analyzed the facts and determined that, while the
commission's stated concerns regarding the expected detrimental effects
of construction of the Nollans' new home (e.g., interference with visual
access to the beach and creation of a "psychological barrier" to beach
access)1 13 were legitimate and, presumably, could have supplied a basis
for outright denial of the permit, the easement dedication requirement
was not sufficiently related to such concerns and did not mitigate the
problems that the coastal commission foresaw would result from the new
construction. 
114
In Nollan, the Court found that construction of the larger home
prompted permissible government concerns over visual and psychologi-
cal access to the beach which might be impeded by the construction of
large homes alongside the ocean.1 15 The Court, however, determined
that the lateral access easement along the Nollans' beachfront would, in
no way, substantially advance the coastal commission's goal of providing
the visual and psychological access to the beach which would be elimi-
nated by the Nollans' new home.
116
For a development condition to be valid under Nollan, it must be
directly related to a detrimental aspect of the project which could have
served as a legitimate basis for project denial. Once the legitimate need or
burden generated by the project is established, the governmental agency
can impose conditions on the development, so long as those conditions
directly mitigate those detrimental effects. Therefore, the Nollan deci-
sion rests on the failure of the lateral access condition to directly relate to
the specific public need generated by the construction of a 1,674 square
foot, modern residence.
Before the Nollans constructed their beachfront residence, public
access did not exist across their beachfront to the public beaches to the
112. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
113. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3149.
114. The Court stated:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on
the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles
to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible to understand
how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it
helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused by construction of the
Nollans' new house.
Id.
115. Id. at 3147.
116. Id. at 3148; see also supra note Ill.
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north and south of their property."I7 Although conceding that creation
of public lateral access easements to connect the two public beaches
might well be a laudable and legitimate governmental goal, the Court
determined that the commission could not require the dedication of such
access since the lateral easement would not mitigate impacts generated
by the development project-specifically, the impairment of visual and
psychological beach access."i8 Conditions such as a height or width limi-
tations on the house or a requirement that a viewing spot be provided on
the property would have been directly related to preserving the coastal
viewshed for public use and would, therefore, have been upheld since the
necessary nexus would be present."19
Curiously, the United States Supreme Court chose a case to follow
First English that, even more than First English itself, involved state in-
terests which had been considered sacrosanct. Both the California Con-
stitution 120 and the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act' 2' insure the
public's access to the precious resource of the California coastline. 22 In-
deed, within the tract surrounding the Nollan property, the California
Coastal Commission had imposed deed restrictions requiring lateral pub-
lic access along the shoreline upon all forty-three of the proposals for
new shorefront development in this tract which had been approved since
the commission's regulations permitted imposition of such conditions. 1
23
Notwithstanding the clear governmental interests in providing public ac-
cess along the shoreline and preserving the California coastline, the
Supreme Court chose this context to restate its policy that a burden im-
posed by a governmental regulation must substantially advance a legiti-
mate state interest and to announce that this substantial advancement
requires a direct nexus between deleterious project effects and the bur-
117. 107 S. Ct. at 3143.
118. See supra note 111.
119. 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
120. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4.
121. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1464 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
122. The California Constitution provides that:
No individual, partnership or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage
or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this State,
shall be permitted to exclude the rights of way to such water whenever it is required
for any public purpose .... and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the
most liberal construction to this provision, so that access to the navigable waters of
this State shall be always attainable for the people thereof.
CAL. CONST. art. X, § 4.
The federal Coastal Zone Management Act provides that it is national policy "to en-
courage and assist the states" in providing for "public access to the coasts for recreational
purposes." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1452(2)(D) (West 1985).
123. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3144.
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dens imposed on a project. If such a strict level of scrutiny applies to
coastal permits, it remains to be seen how the Supreme Court and state
courts will handle burdensome conditions imposed on projects that are in
areas of less environmental sensitivity than the California coast.
B. California Law on Dedication Requirements Before Nollan
Prior to the Supreme Court's Nollan decision, some California
courts had upheld the constitutionality of development conditions with
no direct nexus to legitimate public needs generated by the proposed de-
velopments. Most recent California cases in the exaction and dedication
area have relied upon two cases permitting dedication requirements as a
generic quid pro quo for subdivision approval. In the oldest of these
cases, Ayres v. City Council,124 a subdivider was required to dedicate land
for the widening of a road, even though the proposed road improvement
contemplated future as well as immediate city needs, including potential
future population growth, and despite the fact that the condition would
benefit the city as a whole, rather than merely the subdivider's project.125
The other significant California exaction case carried the Ayres hold-
ing one step further away from the nexus requirement now mandated by
Nollan. In Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 126 a group
of developers challenged the constitutionality of state and local laws
which empowered cities and counties to require the dedication of land, or
payment of fees in lieu thereof, for park or recreational purposes as a
condition to final subdivision map approval. 127 The California Supreme
Court held that such park dedication or fee requirements were constitu-
tional and such conditions could "be justified on the basis of a general
public need for recreational facilities caused by both present and future
subdivisions."' 128 The court discussed the growing public need for open
124. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
125. The court stated: "[I]t is no defense to the conditions imposed in a subdivision map
proceeding that their fulfillment will incidentally also benefit the city as a whole." Id. at 41,
207 P.2d at 7. The court ruled that the city council's refusal to approve petitioner's subdivi-
sion map unless the conditions were followed was not an exercise of the city's eminent domain
power. Rather,
It [was] the petitioner who [was] seeking to acquire the advantages of lot subdivision
and upon him rests the duty of compliance with reasonable conditions for design,
dedication, improvement and restrictive use of the land so as to conform to the safety
and general welfare of the lot owners in the subdivision and of the public.
Id. at 42, 207 P.2d at 7.
126. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971).
127. Id. at 635-36, 484 P.2d at 608-09, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 632-33.
128. Id. at 638, 484 P.2d at 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
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space in the face of California's population and development explosion.
As the court explained:
We see no persuasive reason in the face of these urgent needs
caused by present and anticipated future population growth on the one
hand and the disappearance of open land on the other to hold that a
statute requiring the dedication of land by a subdivider may be justified
only upon the ground that the particular subdivider upon whom an
exaction has been imposed will, solely by the development of his subdi-
vision, increase the need for recreational facilities to such an extent
that additional land for such facilities will be required.
129
In the sixteen years since the Associated Home Builders decision, the
California Supreme Court's pronouncement has been construed by the
state's lower courts to require a connection between a proposed project
and the conditions imposed thereupon in some cases and not to demand
any such nexus in others. California courts have typically upheld condi-
tions and mitigation measures that are rationally based and in the general
public interest.
In the same year that Associated Home Builders was decided, the
California Legislature enacted Government Code section 65909, which
expressly forbids local governmental bodies from conditioning project
approvals on land dedication requirements that are not reasonably re-
lated to the use of the property.' 30 Despite this legislative mandate of a
policy similar to that prescribed by Nollan, many California planning
agencies, prior to Nollan, went much further in exacting dedications than
the provisions of this statute allow, and courts often upheld such
actions. '31
In Liberty v. California Coastal Commission, 132 the petitioner chal-
lenged two conditions placed upon his permit to demolish an existing
structure and erect a restaurant within the jurisdiction of the commis-
sion.' 33 One of these conditions required that the property owner pro-
vide one parking space for every fifty square feet of floor space in his
129. Id. at 639-40, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
130. Section 65909 provides, in part, as follows:
No local governmental body, or any agency thereof, may condition the issuance
of any building or use permit or zone variance on any or all of the following: (a) The
dedication of land for any purpose not reasonably related to the use of the property
for which the variance, building, or use permit is requested.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65909 (West 1983) (emphasis added).
131. See, e.g., Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr.
578 (1985); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d 678, 183
Cal. Rptr. 395 (1982). For discussion of Grupe and Georgia-Pacific, see infra notes 162-70,
154-58 and accompanying text.
132. 113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1980).
133. Id. at 495-96, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50.
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restaurant. 134 The other contested condition required the restaurant
owner to execute a deed restriction obligating him to provide free public
parking in the project parking lot every day until 5:00 p.m. for a period
of thirty years. 135 The Fourth District Court of Appeal discussed both
Ayres and Associated Home Builders and interpreted these cases to re-
quire some nexus between project effects and dedication requirements.
136
In striking down the free public parking requirement, the Liberty court,
much like the Supreme Court in Nollan, stated that unrelated conditions
which merely attempt to shift the burden of providing public benefits are
unreasonable exercises of the police power and are takings of private
property in violation of the Constitution. 137 Operating under the premise
that "the conditions imposed on the grant of land-use applications are
valid if reasonably conceived to fulfill public needs emanating from the
landowner's proposed use,"' 138 the court ruled that the provision of park-
ing spaces for restaurant use was a valid requirement, but that the coastal
commission could not force the property owner to provide free public
parking for individuals lured to the area by other activities and
businesses. 139
The Second District Court of Appeal has also required that dedica-
tion conditions be justified by needs or burdens created by the proposed
project. In Building Industry Association of Southern California v. City of
Oxnard,14° the court of appeal held that an exaction of a fee equal to
2.8% of the building valuation of any new development may indeed help
to ameliorate growth-related problems, but that the fee operated unfairly
and without regard to the actual needs generated by individual building
projects.14 '
In a later Second District Court of Appeal case, Remmenga v. Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission, 142 the petitioners applied to the commission
for permission to construct a single family dwelling on their lot in the
134. Id. at 495, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 500-01, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53.
137. Id. at 502, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
138. Id. at 503, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 254-55 (citing Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275
Cal. App. 2d 412, 421, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872, 879 (1969)).
139. Id. at 504, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
140. 150 Cal. App. 3d 535, 198 Cal. Rptr. 63, 65-66 (1984), vacated, 40 Cal. 3d 1, 706 P.2d
285, 218 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1985) (remanded for reconsideration in light of an amendment to the
city ordinance).
141. Id. at 538, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 65-66.
142. 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 915, reh'g de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985).
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Hollister Ranch subdivision in Santa Barbara County. 14 3 Although the
subdivision itself partially fronted the Pacific Ocean, the petitioners' lot
was located more than a mile from the coast. 44 Pursuant to state law,
the coastal commission granted the building permit subject to the pay-
ment of a $5,000 in-lieu public access fee by the property owners. 145 The
court applied a rational relationship test 46 to determine whether the
condition bore a relationship to the burden imposed on the public by the
project. In finding that the necessary nexus existed, the court stated:
In the present case, the Legislature had ample basis upon which to
conclude that construction of the proposed improvement between the
first public road and the coast, in combination with improvement of
other lots in that area, would have a cumulative adverse impact on the
public's constitutional right of access. 1
4 7
Even though the Remmenga court found a sufficient relationship be-
tween the project and the conditions imposed thereon, it is not clear
whether the Remmenga decision would satisfy the requirements of Nol-
lan, particularly because a good bit of the majority opinion in Remmenga
reads like Justice Brennan's Nollan dissent. 148 Since the property in
143. Id. at 626, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 629-30.
144. Id.
145. Id. The measure requiring this fee was an urgency measure adopted in 1982 in which
the California Legislature determined that
(a) the Legislature hereby finds and declares that a dispute exists at the Hollis-
ter Ranch in Santa Barbara County with respect to the implementation of public
access policies of this division and that it is in the interest of the State and the prop-
erty owners at the Hollister Ranch to resolve this dispute in an expeditious manner.
The Legislature further finds and declares that public access should be provided in a
timely manner and that in order to achieve this goal, while permitting property own-
ers to commence construction, the provisions of this section are necessary to promote
the public's welfare ....
Id. (citing CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30610.8 (West 1987)).
146. Id. at 630, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 632. The test was defined by the court as follows:
If as a condition to receipt of a permit, the applicant must donate property for a
public use that bears no relationship to the benefit conferred on the applicant or the
burden imposed on the public, there is a taking of property without payment of just
compensation in violation of the United States Constitution.... Conversely, if there
is such a rational relationship, the requirement of dedication of property or payment
of money in lieu thereof is a validly imposed condition.
Id. at 627, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 630 (citations omitted).
147. Id. at 630, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
148. Both decisions discussed the important policy favoring public access to the coast and
noted that the policy retains its validity and vitality because of its express recognition in the
California Constitution. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3153 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing CAL.
CONST. art. X, § 4.); Remmenga, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 630, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 632 (same).
Additionally, like the majority in Remmenga, Justice Brennan in Nollan expressed his view
that the condition imposed was rationally and reasonably related to the goal of providing
public access to the beach. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3160-61.
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Remmenga was located over a mile from the ocean, it would be difficult,
after Nollan, for the coastal commission to persuade a court that the
construction of a house on such property would generate a need for pub-
lic beach access and that such need could be the legitimate basis for de-
nial of the building permit application. Although the rational
relationship test set forth in Remmenga may have been properly formu-
lated so as to satisfy the dictates of Nollan, 149 it is unlikely that the man-
ner in which the Remmenga court applied that legal standard to the facts
149. The Nollan Court did not enunciate precisely what standard should henceforth be
used to judge whether there exists a sufficient nexus between the burdens arising from a project
and the conditions imposed thereon. Rather, the Court, "for purposes of discussion," accepted
the coastal commission's proposed test that a condition is valid if "it is reasonably related to
the public need or burden that the [project] creates or to which it contributes." The Court,
however, overturned the condition since it did not meet "even the most untailored standards."
107 S. Ct. at 3148.
While California courts were using a reasonable relation test to determine the legitimacy
of conditions, (e.g., Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 183, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 578, 601 (1985); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 132 Cal. App. 3d
678, 701, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395, 409 (1982)), courts in other jurisdictions developed other stan-
dards. A minority of jurisdictions have applied a "specifically and uniquely attributable" test,
which requires that the need for fee and dedication restrictions imposed upon a developer be
specifically and uniquely attributable to the developer's project. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust and
Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 380, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1961);
Frank Ansuini Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 69, 264 A.2d 910, 913 (1970).
Another widely used and acclaimed standard, the stringency of which falls between the
reasonable relationship test and the specifically and uniquely attributable test, is the rational
nexus standard. See e.g., Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1983) (a condition
imposed by a governmental agency must be rationally related to the benefit conferred upon the
developer by that agency; rational nexus test'is preferable to standards on either extreme);
Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 320 (Fla. 1976) (fees which
do not exceed a pro rata share of reasonably anticipated costs of improvements are permissible
where the improvements are reasonably required and use of the fees collected is limited to
meeting the costs of improvements), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979); Home Builders & Con-
tractors Ass'n v. Board of Palm Beach County Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140, 143-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (impact fees must not exceed the cost of improvements required by the new devel-
opment, and the improvements must adequately benefit the development that is the source of
the fee); Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 865-67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976) (rejecting both Ayres' reasonably related test as an insufficient restraint on government
and the Pioneer Trust "specifically and uniquely attributable" test as unduly restrictive, and
adopting instead the rational nexus approach), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 955 (1977). See gener-
ally Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Government's Capital Funding
Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 415, 430-33 (1981) (discussing appropriate standards for de-
termining constitutionality of impact fees).
Although the Supreme Court in Nollan did not delineate which particular standard is
most appropriate, the Court's decision strongly implies that a mere reasonable relation be-
tween a project and conditions imposed upon it will be insufficient. Many courts throughout
the country are likely to agree with the Florida courts that an extremely tight nexus test is too
unwieldy for widespread use. It is likely that, in the wake of Nollan and absent further
Supreme Court direction, the rational nexus test will be relied upon more heavily by courts
and governmental agencies.
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would fulfill the heightened scrutiny envisioned by the United States
Supreme Court in Nollan. 150
Numerous other California cases have relied on Ayres and Associ-
ated Home Builders to uphold the validity of development conditions
that were not clearly necessitated by project effects. For instance, in
Frisco Land & Mining Co. v. State, '5' the First District Court of Appeal
upheld several development conditions imposed upon a subdivider 152 on
the grounds that "a regulatory body may require a dedication of property
in the interest of the general welfare as a condition of permitting the
subdivision of lands." 1
53
Other cases decided by the First District Court of Appeal are dra-
matic evidence of the relative freedom that governmental agencies were
able to exercise with regard to development conditions prior to Nollan.
Project permit conditions requiring dedication of easements providing
public access to the shoreline were once again the subject of attack in
Georgia-Pacific Corporation v. California Coastal Commission. 154 These
dedication conditions were imposed upon Georgia-Pacific when it ap-
plied for permits to erect a fence around its property and to build a heli-
copter pad, hangar, parking lot, and various other facilities on the
shoreline property where it operated a lumber processing facility. 155 The
court upheld most of the access dedication requirements 156 without even
considering whether the new construction would contribute to a need for
public beach access. 157 The court reasoned that:
A regulatory body may constitutionally require a dedication of
property in the interests of the general welfare as a condition of permit-
150. See infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
151. 74 Cal. App. 3d 736, 754, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820, 830 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918
(1978).
152. A regional commission decided that a permit to construct single family dwellings
would be granted if the landowners provided erosion control and beach access. Id. at 749-50,
141 Cal. Rptr. at 828. Another condition required landowners to maintain common areas and
to make necessary repairs of the common areas damaged by landslides, soil creep, sloughing,
slumping, gullying or erosion. Id. at 750-51, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 828-29.
153. Id. at 753, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
154. 132 Cal. App. 3d 678, 183 Cal. Rptr. 395 (1982).
155. Id. at 683-86, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 397-400.
156. The court found that some of the imposed access easements were an abuse of the
commission's discretion since they had been imposed on the basis of speculation that Georgia-
Pacific might, in the future, change its land use so as to make further dedication of easements
feasible. Id. at 700, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 408. The court, however, held that there was no evi-
dence to support this notion and that the pertinent section of the California Coastal Act, CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 30212 (1979) (amended 1983), does not authorize the commission to im-
pose access conditions on the basis of speculation. Georgia-Pacific, 132 Cal. App. 3d at 700,
183 Cal. Rptr. at 408.
157. Id. at 699, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08.
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ting land development. It does not act in eminent domain when it does
this, and the validity of the dedication requirement is not dependent on
a factual showing that the development has created the need for it.
The "scope and extent" of the easements required by the Commission
were "reasonably related" to one of the principal objectives of the
Coastal Act, which is to provide for maximum access to the coast by
all the people of this state. Their relationship to the "nature and im-
pact" of the proposed projects was not a valid basis for the trial court's
determination that the access conditions deprived Georgia-Pacific of
its constitutional rights.
158
Plainly, the Georgia-Pacific court concluded that, in order to be
valid, conditions needed only to benefit the general welfare and did not
have to be necessitated by the particular project bearing the burden of the
conditions. Indeed, in Norsco Enterprises v. City of Fremont, 5 9 a condi-
tion that an applicant pay "in-lieu" park fees in conjunction with the
tentative subdivision map approval for conversion of existing apartment
units into condominium units was upheld, despite the fact that no physi-
cal change was planned for the residential complex and there would be
no influx of new residents generated by the condominium conversion.' 60
Nevertheless, these California courts could have relied on Government
Code section 65912, which declares that open-space zoning ordinances
may not "take or damage private property for public use" without just
compensation,16 ' to find governmental actions such as those in Norsco
unconstitutional. Yet, they often chose to uphold the validity of park
dedication or in-lieu fee requirements. It would seem that application of
158. Id. (citations omitted). The California Coastal Act provides the following legislative
findings: "The Legislature... finds and declares that the basic goals of the state for the coastal
zone are to: ... (c) Maximize public access to and along the coast and maximize public recrea-
tional opportunities in the coastal zone consistent with sound resources, conservation princi-
ples and constitutionally protected rights of private property owners." CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 30001.5(c) (West 1986).
159. 54 Cal. App. 3d 488, 126 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1976).
160. Id. at 498, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 665. The court upheld the "in-lieu" park fees on three
separate grounds: (1) that Associated Home Builders made it clear that a municipality can
require fees even though there will be no new residents; (2) that statutes providing for the
acquisition and maintenance of open space lands must be upheld whenever possible; and (3)
that Norsco Enterprises had not suffered a denial of equal protection, even though the fee was
charged to condominium developers and not to developers of apartment complexes. This clas-
sification was deemed rational and not arbitrary. Id. at 495-98, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 662-65.
161. Section 65912 provides:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that this article is not intended, and
shall not be construed, as authorizing the city or the county to exercise its power to
adopt, amend or repeal an open-space zoning ordinance in a manner which will take
or damage private property for public use without the payment of just compensation
therefor. This section is not intended to increase or decrease the rights of any owner
of property under the Constitution of the State of California or of the United States.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65912 (West 1983).
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the Nollan nexus analysis to these cases would leave their holdings
suspect.
For example, the facts of Grupe v. California Coastal Commission 162
were strikingly similar to the facts before the Court in Nollan. Moreover,
Grupe formed much of the basis for the Second District Court of Ap-
peal's decision to support the lateral public access easement imposed
upon the Nollans. 63 The subject property in Grupe was, like that in
Nollan, a beachfront residential lot located in an enclave of homes be-
tween two public beaches.1 64 The California Coastal Commission had
granted Grupe a permit to build a single family home on his lot subject to
the dedication of a lateral public access easement along the ocean.' 65
The court in Grupe engaged in a lengthy discussion concerning the
proper standard for testing the general validity of all exactions. The
court agreed with the property owner that a particular exaction must be
related to needs to which the development contributes. 166 The court,
however, went on to point out that Ayres and Associated Home Builders
had allowed "consideration of future needs and potential population
growth in formulating the conditions imposed upon the subdivider.' 67
The court relied on the California Supreme Court's statement that condi-
tions "can be justified on the basis of a general public need for recrea-
tional facilities caused by present and future subdivisions." 68 The Grupe
court concluded that the appropriate standard required that "there need
be only an indirect relationship between an exaction and a need to which
the project contributes."'' 69 The court held that the dedication require-
ment was properly designed to meet needs to which the project contrib-
uted, at least in an incidental manner, since Grupe's home would be "one
more brick in the wall" separating the public from the ocean. 170 In the
wake of Nollan, Grupe would probably be decided differently if brought
before a California court today.
162. 166 Cal. App. 3d 148. 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
163. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, re-
view denied, 177 Cal. 3d 719 (1986), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
164. Grupe, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 155, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
165. Id. at 157, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
166. Id. at 163-64, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 586-88. The court stated, however, that "there is no
additional requirement that the exaction directly or indirectly benefit the development" as the
respondent had maintained. Id. at 164, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
167. Id. at 165, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
168. Id. (citing Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638,
484 P.2d 606, 610-11, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634-35 (1971)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 167, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 589-90.
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C. Implications of Nollan
The implications of the Nollan case, like First English, will undoubt-
edly be far reaching. In fact, the practical application and significance of
Nollan may prove to be even greater than that of First English.
Supreme Court Justice Stevens, in his Nollan dissent, expressed
grave concern regarding the combined effects of First English and Nollan.
Justice Stevens maintained that the Nollan case evidences the uncertainty
surrounding the Court's takings jurisprudence and demonstrates how
easily public officials can, in good faith, "disagree about the validity of
specific types of land-use regulation." 171 Justice Stevens is fearful of the
interaction between these two significant land-use cases because,
although the extent tb which governmental agencies are empowered to
regulate land use is rather uncertain, First English forces local govern-
ments to pay for mistakes made in the land-use regulation arena. 172 Ste-
vens predicts a chilling effect on the enactment of land-use regulations
and, in all likelihood, his prediction will prove accurate. He posits that,
as a result of First English and Nollan, planning authorities will "be left
guessing about how the Court will react to the next case, and the one
after that." 17
3
It is possible that planners and governmental officials may not be
seriously affected in their efforts to exact conditions from developers if
they are careful, thoughtful, and attentive to detail at all crucial steps in
the establishment of the required nexus. As Justice Brennan noted in his
lengthy Nollan dissent, governmental agencies, to avoid claims of uncon-
stitutional takings, must now use their expertise to demonstrate a specific
and logical connection between burdens produced by new development
and conditions designed to alleviate such burdens. 174 Undoubtedly, most
future litigation concerning the legitimacy of development conditions
will focus on the formal findings made by the governmental agency when
it takes action upon a project. Agencies will have to finely tune and
clearly document their findings in order for the nexus conclusions to
withstand careful scrutiny.
Justice Scalia suggests that careful attention to the findings,
although important, may not be enough to prevent a taking. He
comments:
We do not share Justice Brennan's confidence that the Commis-
sion "should have little difficulty in the future in utilizing its expertise
171. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3163 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 3164 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 3161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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to demonstrate a specific connection between provisions for access and
burdens on access," that will avoid the effect of today's decision. We
view the fifth amendment's property clause to be more than a pleading
requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in
cleverness and imagination. As indicated earlier, our cases describe
the condition for abridgement of property rights through the police
power as a "substantial advanc[ing]" of a legitimate state interest. We
are inclined to be particularly careful about the objective where the
actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting of a
land use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that
the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than
the stated police power objective. 1 75
What Justice Scalia is saying to Justice Brennan and to governmen-
tal bodies throughout the country is that mere attention to findings will
simply not be enough to legitimate an otherwise inappropriate exercise of
the police power requiring a landowner to dedicate property in a manner
which is not reasonably related to the burdens or needs arising from the
landowner's project.
Indeed, Justice Scalia goes on to suggest that the scrutiny the Court
will utilize in reviewing land-use decisions is more than the traditional,
rational basis approach, which Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion,
forcefully notes has been the Court's standard of review in takings
cases. 176 Traditionally, exercises of the police power were deemed to be
constitutionally legitimate if they were rationally related to proper gov-
ernmental objectives. 177 Justice Scalia, in the Nollan majority opinion,
disagrees with this standard. He implies that the Court, in the future,
will more carefully scrutinize governmental conditions, 78 particularly
175. Id. at 3150 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
176. Id. at 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("It is also by now commonplace that this
Court's review of the rationality of a state's exercise of its police power demands only that the
State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objec-
tive.") (emphasis in original).
177. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922);
see also Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3151 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. Justice Scalia begins his discussion of the applicable standard by stating:
We have long recognized that land use regulation does not effect a taking if it
"substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests" and does not "den[y] an owner
economically viable use of his land," . . . Our cases have not elaborated on the stan-
dards for determining what constitutes a "legitimate state interest" or what type of
connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the requirement that
the former "substantially advance" the latter.
Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146-47 (citation omitted). Scalia then proceeded to elaborate on the
proper standard for determining whether a regulation substantially advances legitimate state
interests. The majority disagreed with Justice Brennan's characterization of the appropriate
standard as a deferential one which merely seeks to ensure rationality among decision-makers,
stating that "[c]ontrary to Justice Brennan's claim .... [w]e have required that the regulation
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where they require a landowner to provide property for the use of the
public.
179
This analysis is reminiscent of the strict judicial scrutiny doctrine
developed by the Warren Court in its application of the equal protection
clause to strike down governmental regulations and laws which were ra-
cially suspect'80 or which imposed limitations on a citizen's ability to
vote.181 In fact, Justice Scalia refers to the equal protection clause in the
footnotes of his majority opinion. He comments in footnote four:
If the Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of Cali-
fornia's attempt to remedy these problems, although they had not con-
tributed to it more than other coastal landowners, the state's action,
even if otherwise valid, might violate either the incorporated Takings
Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. One of the principal purposes
of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be borne by the public as a whole."'
182
Justice Scalia may be indicating that, in an appropriate case, the
Court might apply the equal protection clause to strike down otherwise
reasonable conditions which single out particular private property own-
ers to provide public benefits. The Court could apply this form of special
heightened judicial scrutiny where fundamental interests, such as prop-
erty rights, are being impaired. For example, because of limitations on
the public fisc in recent years, particularly in California, governmental
bodies have imposed rigorous conditions on new developments which ef-
fectively contribute the "last drop in the bucket" with regard to traffic or
related constraints. Frequently, developers of new residential develop-
ments have been required to provide an entirely new road or other major
circulation improvements due to traffic constraints caused primarily by
other, earlier developments. Justice Scalia, in Nollan, may be suggesting
'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved, not that 'the State
could rationally have decided' the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective." Id. at
3147 n.3 (citations omitted).
179. Id. at 3150.
180. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]II legal restric-
tions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.... [C]ourts
must subject ... [the restrictions] to the most rigid scrutiny.").
181. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). "We conclude
that a state violates [equal protection] whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment
of any fee an electoral standard." Id. at 666. "[C]lassification which might invade or restrain
[.. (equal protection rights and liberties] must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined."
Id. at 670; see also Note, Development in the Law--Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969) (analyzing the Supreme Court's scope of review in the equal protection area).
182. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147 n.4 (citations omitted).
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that the imposition of such a hurdle on the developer might be an unfair
and unconstitutional denial of equal protection.
After Nollan, many questions remain about the legitimacy of vari-
ous types of exactions and linkage programs which have been freely uti-
lized by governmental planning agencies and which, until Nollan, have
been presumed valid. Naturally, requirements to dedicate land for such
purposes as park and recreational use or public access to beaches will be
strictly scrutinized by developers and their representatives, as will in-lieu
fees for the provision of such services in a location other than the project
site. Under Nollan, such dedication and fee requirements will remain
valid as long as they are necessitated by development of the project and
their need could be a basis for complete prohibition of the project. The
same concepts hold true for traffic mitigation fees, provision of day-care
services by developers of office space and requirements that commercial
developers contribute toward affordable housing development funds.
Planning authorities, however, may be obligated to clearly justify their
method in determining the amount of fees or extent of services to be
provided by the developer. Governmental agencies may be forced to em-
ploy experts to document the validity of fee schedules imposed upon
developers.
For example, consider San Francisco's program of using office de-
velopment fees to help finance low- and moderate-income housing within
the city.' 83 Presently, developers of office space are assessed a fee of
$5.34 per square foot of office space over fifty thousand square feet.' 84
183. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUN. PLANNING CODE art. III, § 313 (1987) (Housing Re-
quirements for Office Development Projects). The code finds that "[t]here is a low vacancy
rate for housing affordable to persons of low and moderate income" which is "due in part to
large office developments which have attracted and will continue to attract additional employ-
ees and residents to the City." Id. The program requires that developers of 50,000 or more
gross square feet of office space either pay an in-lieu fee to the city or construct housing units
(net addition of gross square feet of office space multiplied by .000386 equals the number of
housing units to be provided), 62% of which must be affordable to households of low and
moderate income for 20 years. Id.
184. Id. § 313(b). This subsection of San Francisco's Planning Code justifies the fee by
stating that
[t]he required housing exaction shall be based upon formulae derived in the re-
port entitled "The Economic Basis for an Office Housing Production Program in San
Francisco," prepared by Recht, Hausrath & Associates, dated July 19, 1984. The
aforesaid report concludes that the cost to provide affordable housing to persons at-
tracted to large office developments in the C-3 District is $9.47 to S10.47 per square
foot. However, in recognition of the numerous assumptions which were made in the
report and hence the potential inexactitude of the final calculation, the City has se-
lected the conservative figure of $5.34 per square foot as the cost for purposes of this
ordinance.
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As Nollan works its way into the development process, San Francisco
office developers may challenge the city to demonstrate how their partic-
ular developments will contribute to a need for low- and moderate-in-
come housing. This could only be argued on the basis that future
employees of such office space will earn low and moderate incomes, will
not already live within San Francisco, and will desire to live within the
city. No one denies the need for such affordable housing; rather, Nollan
calls into question the legal propriety of shifting the burden of the cost of
the public benefit to the "last guy on the block" with a perceived deep
pocket.
Similar challenges are likely to arise concerning levies against devel-
opment projects for the purpose of funding the construction or recon-
struction of school facilities under recently enacted California
legislation.1 85 The school impact fee program permits school boards to
assess fees of up to $1.50 per square foot on new residential development
and twenty-five cents per square foot on new commercial or industrial
development.' 8 6 Cities and counties are prohibited from issuing permits
to developers who cannot present evidence of compliance with the appli-
cable school district's requirements.1 87 The California Government
Code specifies that no fees may be levied against commercial or industrial
development unless the governing board of the school district has made a
finding that the amount of fees to be paid is needed for community school
facilities and is reasonably related and limited to the need for schools
caused by the commercial or industrial development. 188 Generally, a
school district enacts such a finding to apply to all future development
within the school district. Nollan supplies commercial and industrial de-
velopers with a potential basis for challenging the imposition of school
district fees, absent clear evidence of a direct nexus between commercial
or industrial developments and the increased need for school facilities.
School districts may argue that an expansion of employment opportuni-
ties brings new residents into an area and impacts the need for school
facilities. Developers might counter this argument by maintaining that,
if residential development within the school district is assessed a fee, then
any increase, in residents will result in an accompanying increase in state
school funds. Thus, they may argue, assessment of commercial and in-
dustrial development is a form of double taxation. This recently enacted
school construction financing scheme is likely to be tested 'in the near
185. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 53080 (West Supp. 1987).
186. Id. § 65995(b)(1), (2).
187. Id. § 53080(b).
188. Id. § 65995(b)(2).
future and it will be interesting to observe how courts will apply Nollan
to the resolution of this issue.
Nollan raises additional concerns in other areas of environmental
law in which the California Legislature has issued broad directives to
state agencies. For example, in Nollan itself, the Supreme Court circum-
scribed the heretofore relatively unchecked power of the California
Coastal Commission to carry out its duties without compensating land-
owners for infringement upon and deprivation of property wrought by
the commission. The California Legislature had bestowed upon the com-
mission a broad mandate to protect the state's coastal zone, enhancing
and restoring its quality, conserving its resources, and maximizing its
availability to the public.' 89 The United States Supreme Court has now
clarified that, although these goals are laudable and should be pursued,
where they deprive landowners of the use of their property absent a di-
rect nexus between project benefits and burdens, they must be pursued
through eminent domain.
There are several other areas of the law in which the California Leg-
islature has directed governmental agencies to pursue, with sweeping di-
rectives, broadly stated environmental goals. One of these environmental
areas, which also significantly impacts the planning and development
process, concerns the California Environmental Quality Act of 1975
(CEQA).190
CEQA mandates that all potentially significant environmental ef-
fects of a proposed project be studied and evaluated prior to the project's
approval.'91 Under CEQA, governmental agencies must consider all rel-
evant environmental assessments prior to approving a project and must
make good faith efforts to mitigate potential environmental effects of a
project through appropriate development conditions. 1 9 2 As long as miti-
gating conditions imposed upon development through the CEQA process
are truly necessitated by burdens expected to be generated by the pro-
posed development (i.e., public burdens which support project denial),
and the need for such conditions is established by the environmental as-
189. See California Coastal Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30001-30900 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1987).
190. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986 & Supp. 1987). Guidelines for
the implementation of CEQA are contained in CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. XIV, §§ 15000-15387
(1983).
191. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21082.2, 21083, 21100, 21151 (West 1986); CAL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. XIV, §§ 15064, 15065, 15126 (1983).
192. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080; CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. XIV, §§ 15074, 15091,
15093, 15096 (1983).
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sessment document, 93 conditions imposed to mitigate potential environ-
mental detriment will be sufficiently related to satisfy the Nollan nexus
test. CEQA, however, is also frequently used as a political tool by indi-
viduals who are opposed to a proposed project. If the environmental
assessment process is so misused as to require development conditions
that are not actually designed to mitigate environmental impacts, but in-
stead are political compromises reached between planning authorities
and project opponents, developers may be able to use Nollan to challenge
such conditions as unrelated to the studied environmental effects of the
proposed project.
Similarly, in other areas where both Congress and the state legisla-
ture have directed governmental agencies to take severe and affirmative
action to ensure environmental quality, such as air, water, and soil qual-
ity, the government may now be forced to compensate landowners when-
ever conditions relative to these areas are imposed upon development
projects which do not contribute to deterioration of environmental qual-
ity. For example, a landowner may be required to remove toxic sub-
stances from its soil in return for permission to build upon the land, even
when construction of the project would not aggravate the hazardous
waste problem and would not expose persons or property to dangerous
conditions.
Nollan also raises questions concerning how cumulative impact con-
cerns can be mitigated through individual development conditions.
Under CEQA, a governmental agency is obligated to consider all cumu-
lative effects of proposed and anticipated developments, in conjunction
with the effects of the instant development proposal, and to assess how
these cumulative impacts will affect the environment. 94 Often, mitigat-
ing conditions imposed upon a project are designed to alleviate all 'or
193. The project-reviewing agency conducts an initial study to determine whether "the
project may have a significant effect on the environment." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. XIV,
§ 15063(a) (1983). If following this study "there is substantial evidence that any aspect of the
project, either individually or cumulatively, may cause a significant effect on the environment,
regardless of whether the overall effect of the project is adverse or beneficial," the governmen-
tal agency must prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) or use a prior EIR that ade-
quately analyzes the instant project. Id. § 15063(b)(1). An EIR is an informational document
(often lengthy and technical) that evaluates the significant environmental effects of a project,
identifies ways to minimize these effects, and describes reasonable alternatives to the project.
Id. § 15121. If the agency determines that there is no substantial evidence that the project may
significantly affect the environment, or if the applicant acquiesces to project modifications or
conditions which will alleviate otherwise adverse impacts of the project, the reviewing agency
must prepare a negative declaration. Id. § 15063(b)(2)(c). A negative declaration states "that
the project will not have a significant effect on the environment" and lists any mitigation meas-
ures designed to avoid significant effects. Id. § 15071.
194. Id. §§ 15126(e), 15130; see also id. § 15355 (defining cumulative impacts).
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some of the cumulative impact of a project, rather than to address merely
the impacts of the individual project alone. The Nollan decision leaves
open several questions concerning the manner in which cumulative im-
pacts will be addressed in the future. If Nollan limits the nexus consider-
ation to the connection between the individual proposed project and the
condition designed to alleviate the adverse effects thereof, governmental
agencies must be quite careful in utilizing cumulative impacts when de-
signing development conditions. On the one hand, CEQA requires the
mitigation of significant environmental impacts which, in fact, are pri-
marily cumulative in nature; on the other hand, Nollan requires restraint
in designing mitigation measures that do not extend beyond the specific
needs generated by the individual project.
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court recognized
that the coastal commission could deny the Nollans' permit application
(or impose a related condition) if the construction of their new house
"alone or by reason of the cumulative impact produced in conjunction
with other construction" would substantially impede permissible govern-
mental purposes. 95 The Court's statement indicates that it would uphold
consideration of cumulative impacts as part of the nexus formula, partic-
ularly with regard to permissible reasons for project denial. The Court
couches this statement in footnote six, however, indicating that a taking
would occur if the Nollans were singled out to bear the burden of reme-
dying problems of a cumulative nature.196 Therefore, it appears that cu-
mulative impacts enter into the computation of a project's detrimental
effects, so long as that project is not, as a result, burdened with condi-
tions to a significantly greater degree than other impact-generating
projects. Alternatively, governmental bodies may feel compelled to deny
approval of projects rather than risk litigation challenging overly burden-
some conditions.
Of course, it will be up to the courts to ultimately determine how
specific and individualized the nexus between development burdens and
development conditions must be. The ensuing period of uncertainty will
be perhaps one of the most challenging in the area of land-use planning
since the Supreme Court's landmark zoning decision over sixty years ago
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty. 197
195. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147.
196. Id. at 3147 n.4.
197. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In this case, the Supreme Court blessed zoning laws for the first
time, holding that a zoning ordinance that prohibited industrial development in an area zoned
for residential purposes was a valid exercise of the city's police power and, therefore, did not
constitutionally harm the landowner. Id. at 397. The Court concluded that the zoning ordi-
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Conclusion
Although the precise effects of First English and Nollan on land-use
law and practice in California are difficult to predict at this point since
the Court has left several significant issues unresolved, it is clear that the
long-range implications of these cases will be extremely far reaching.
With the anticipated replacement of retiring Justice Powell with a poten-
tially more conservative Supreme Court Justice, it remains to be seen
whether First English and Nollan are merely the first of many steps to be
taken by the Supreme Court to erode the prerogative of local governmen-
tal agencies in the land-use area and to strengthen the position of private
property owners. Conversely, the Supreme Court may have merely
wished to clarify its jurisprudential thinking on these two particular
points and the Court's agenda concerning land-use regulation may end
here. Land-use planners, developers, municipal officials and environ-
mental groups throughout the country anxiously await further directives
from the Supreme Court and state courts to determine precisely how
much the rules of the game have changed. One thing is certain-the
Court's decisions in First English and Nollan have raised the stakes.
nance was reasonable and not arbitrary because it protected the public health, safety, and
morals and promoted the general welfare. Id. at 395.
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